The New Counterinsurgency Era
The New Counterinsurgency Era
Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
David H. Ucko, Foreword by Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.)
“This is hot-off-the-press history, an essential look at how the Pentagon has—and hasn’t—changed in response to the Iraq war.”
—Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-08
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures?
In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process.
Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
Praise for The New Counterinsurgency Era
“Perhaps the most important attribute of a successful armed force is the ability to adapt rapidly during war. David Ucko describes how the U.S. Army and Marine Corps adapted to insurgency and, more importantly, why and whether those adaptations are likely to stick. This is required reading for those guiding the future of the Armed Forces.”
—Thomas X. Hammes, colonel, United States Marine Corps (Ret.) and author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century
“David Ucko’s book is a very instructional addition to the literature on American counterinsurgency. His clear and informed depiction of the institutional obstacles to deep and enduring reform comes at a critical time. A failure to heed his analysis and admonitions could again result in intellectual amnesia and unnecessary and tragic losses in blood and treasure in a future insurgency.”
—Bard E. O’Neill, author of Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse
“An insightful and objective evaluation of the Pentagon’s halting progress towards a true transformation. Facing an insidious global insurgency, today’s military is at a crossroads as it adapts from a myopic focus on the kinds of wars it prefers to those that we ignore at our peril. Required reading for serious professionals and students of national security policy.”
—Frank Hoffman, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Additional praise for The New Counterinsurgency Era.
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